American Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes signs an agreement during the Washington Naval Conference in February 1922. The negotiations produced treaties limiting naval construction and addressing Pacific security and Chinese sovereignty.
November 1921–February 1922 · Washington, D.C. · Naval Disarmament and Pacific Diplomacy
By Robert M. Dobo
The First World War had demonstrated the extraordinary destructive capacity of modern industrial states, but it had not removed the conditions that encouraged them to compete for military superiority. Even as governments struggled with reconstruction, debts and public demands for reduced expenditure, their naval establishments continued to plan for fleets of increasingly powerful warships. The battleship remained a symbol of national prestige, industrial achievement and international influence. Building one was enormously expensive; allowing a rival to build more could appear even more dangerous.
By 1921, the possibility of another naval arms race was becoming difficult to ignore. Britain possessed a worldwide empire whose security depended upon maritime communications, while the United States was completing an ambitious programme intended to secure its position among the leading naval powers. Japan, strengthened by its victories over China and Russia and its participation in the First World War, sought to consolidate its position in East Asia and the western Pacific. Each government viewed its naval requirements through a different strategic calculation, but all confronted the same problem: competition could impose immense financial burdens without necessarily making anyone more secure.
On November 12, 1921, representatives of nine countries assembled in Washington, D.C., at the invitation of President Warren G. Harding's administration. The gathering was formally known as the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, although history would remember it as the Washington Naval Conference. Its immediate purpose was to restrain naval construction, but its wider significance lay in an ambitious attempt to negotiate a more predictable international order in the Pacific.
The conference would produce three principal agreements: the Five-Power Treaty limiting naval armaments, the Four-Power Treaty addressing Pacific possessions, and the Nine-Power Treaty concerning China. Together, they formed what became known as the Washington Conference system. For its supporters, this represented a practical alternative to unrestricted military rivalry. For its critics, it formalized inequalities that the treaties themselves could do little to resolve.
Both interpretations contained important elements of the historical reality.
The Cost of Sea Power
The unfinished American battleship USS Washington (BB-47) is launched at Camden, New Jersey, on September 1, 1921. Construction was halted under the Washington Naval Treaty, and the incomplete vessel was sunk as a target in 1924.
The naval competition preceding the First World War had been dominated by Britain and Germany, whose construction of increasingly powerful battleships contributed to diplomatic suspicion and strategic anxiety. Germany's defeat removed that particular challenge to British maritime supremacy, but it did not eliminate competition among the surviving powers. Instead, the focus shifted increasingly toward the Pacific, where American and Japanese ambitions intersected.
The United States had authorized a major naval expansion in 1916, before its entry into the European war. Although the conflict interrupted elements of the programme, American planners continued to regard a powerful fleet as essential to national security and influence overseas. The country's industrial resources gave it the potential to challenge Britain's longstanding naval superiority, while its possessions in the Philippines and Guam placed American interests within the strategic reach of Japan.
Britain faced a different predicament. Its fleet protected trade routes connecting the British Isles with an empire extending across several oceans. The Royal Navy needed to maintain a presence in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and Pacific, yet the financial consequences of the war had placed severe pressure upon British public expenditure. Maintaining superiority against several possible competitors was becoming increasingly difficult to justify, particularly when much of the British public wanted the government to concentrate upon economic recovery.
Japan's position was shaped by its geography and its emergence as a major imperial power. Its victory over Russia in 1905 had demonstrated that a European power could be defeated at sea by an Asian state, while the First World War allowed Japan to seize German-controlled interests in Shandong and occupy German Pacific islands north of the equator. The postwar settlement confirmed Japanese administration over the latter territories under the League of Nations mandate system. These gains extended Japan's strategic influence, but also sharpened American concerns over the balance of power in East Asia.
Japanese naval planners pursued an ambitious programme commonly described as the Eight-Eight Fleet, envisaging eight modern battleships and eight modern battlecruisers. The objective was to maintain a force capable of confronting a major opponent, above all the United States, in a decisive naval engagement. Such a fleet demanded enormous expenditure, however, and Japanese officials disagreed over whether the financial and diplomatic costs could be sustained.
These rival ambitions explain why the Washington gathering was more than an idealistic appeal for peace. Every principal participant had strategic reasons to negotiate. The Americans wanted to avoid an expensive competition with Britain and Japan; the British sought relief from naval commitments that exceeded their diminishing financial flexibility; and important figures within the Japanese government recognized that a negotiated settlement might provide greater security than continued construction.
American Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes transformed these shared concerns into a concrete proposal. At the opening session, he advocated cancelling capital ships under construction, scrapping older vessels and imposing a lengthy restriction upon further building. Rather than beginning with vague expressions of goodwill, Hughes presented specific reductions that would affect his own country's fleet as well as those of its competitors.
The proposal established a remarkable starting point. Governments that had spent decades equating battleship construction with national strength were now being asked to accept that fewer ships might offer a more stable form of security. [1]
Five Powers and the Arithmetic of Security
Japanese representatives and American officials photographed in Washington on October 24, 1921, before the naval conference opened. Japan's delegates faced the difficult task of reconciling naval ambitions, financial constraints and concerns about strategic equality.
The Five-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, became the central achievement of the conference. Its signatories were the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France and Italy. The agreement established ceilings on capital-ship tonnage and restricted further construction, requiring substantial reductions in existing and planned fleets.
Its most famous provision was the 5:5:3 ratio between the United States, Britain and Japan. In simplified terms, American and British capital-ship strength would remain equal, while Japan would be permitted approximately 60 per cent of either fleet. France and Italy received smaller allowances.
The treaty specified maximum capital-ship replacement tonnage of 525,000 standard tons each for the United States and the British Empire, 315,000 tons for Japan, and 175,000 tons each for France and Italy. It also established separate aircraft-carrier tonnage ceilings and restrictions on individual warship size and armament. A broadly ten-year suspension of new battleship construction followed, subject to negotiated exceptions and replacement provisions.
The agreement therefore involved considerably more than a promise to stop building ships. It required governments to cancel construction programmes, dispose of vessels and accept international rules governing the size and characteristics of future capital ships. Aircraft carriers, still an emerging component of naval warfare, were already substantial enough to warrant their own restrictions.
Nevertheless, the ratio concealed a difficult political problem. Japan was being asked to accept a formally subordinate position within an international system in which national prestige and naval strength remained closely connected.
Japanese naval officers had argued that a fleet approximately 70 per cent as strong as the American navy was necessary for national defence. Their reasoning reflected the geography of a possible Pacific war. While the United States possessed greater overall industrial and naval resources, an American fleet fighting near Japan would have to operate across enormous distances. Japanese forces, supported from nearby bases, might therefore enjoy advantages that could compensate for some numerical inferiority.
Not everyone in Japan accepted the same calculation. Navy Minister Admiral Katō Tomosaburō, who led the Japanese delegation on naval matters, recognized that the proposed restrictions also limited American expansion. A smaller Japanese fleet could remain strategically effective if the United States and Britain were prevented from developing overwhelming superiority in the western Pacific. Moreover, avoiding an unrestricted construction race offered considerable economic advantages.
Katō accepted the 60 per cent ratio, but the decision exposed divisions within Japan's naval establishment. Officers who opposed the agreement regarded it as an unnecessary concession, and the dispute contributed to the later emergence of competing treaty-supporting and treaty-opposing factions within the Imperial Japanese Navy. It would be misleading, however, to treat Japanese policy as uniformly hostile to naval limitation. Important Japanese officials defended the treaty as a practical means of protecting national security while reducing expenditure.
A further compromise was crucial. Under Article XIX, the United States, Britain and Japan agreed to maintain the existing status of specified naval bases and fortifications in the Pacific. Restrictions applied to American possessions including Guam and the Philippines, British Hong Kong, and specified Japanese territories. Important exceptions included Hawaii and certain British imperial territories and bases.
For Japan, the restrictions helped compensate for the disparity in capital-ship tonnage by limiting the capacity of potential rivals to strengthen forward bases near Japanese-controlled waters. For American naval planners, however, the same provisions raised troubling questions about their ability to reinforce distant possessions during a crisis.
The treaty thus imposed numerical limits while acknowledging that military power depended upon geography, bases and the ability to operate ships at great distances. Its architects had not abolished strategic rivalry; they had negotiated rules within which that rivalry would continue.
Even so, the reductions were substantial. Warships already under construction were cancelled or repurposed, and the leading naval powers temporarily abandoned the accelerating battleship programmes that had threatened to consume immense national resources. The achievement should not be discounted simply because subsequent events would eventually undermine it. [2]
Four Powers and the Preservation of Empire
The naval agreement could not function independently of the wider political relationships among its signatories. The Pacific was not an empty expanse separating rival fleets. It contained colonies, dependencies, military bases and territories whose inhabitants exercised little influence over the decisions being made in Washington.
One particularly sensitive issue concerned the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, originally concluded in 1902 and subsequently revised. The alliance had served important British and Japanese interests, particularly during the years when both governments were concerned about Russian influence in East Asia. After the First World War, however, its continuation had become increasingly awkward.
For the United States, the alliance raised the possibility that Britain might be drawn into a confrontation involving Japan and America. British policymakers were unwilling to accept such a prospect, especially when relations with the United States had become central to Britain's broader diplomatic and financial position. Yet Britain also wanted to avoid abruptly alienating Japan, with which it had maintained a significant strategic partnership.
The Four-Power Treaty offered a solution. Signed on December 13, 1921, by the United States, the British Empire, Japan and France, it committed the participating governments to respect one another's rights concerning their Pacific island possessions and dominions. Disputes affecting those rights were to be discussed through consultation, while threats from outside powers would prompt communication about possible responses.
This was not a collective-defence treaty. It did not require the signatories automatically to go to war on one another's behalf. Its significance lay instead in replacing the bilateral Anglo-Japanese alliance with a broader arrangement intended to reduce suspicion and encourage diplomatic consultation.
The Anglo-Japanese alliance would terminate when the new treaty entered into force following ratification, removing one of the diplomatic complications surrounding American-Japanese relations. Yet the replacement agreement was conservative in another sense: it sought to preserve existing imperial possessions rather than reconsider the legitimacy of foreign control over them.
For the peoples living under colonial administration, the distinction mattered enormously. The governments negotiating Pacific stability were principally concerned with securing their own territorial rights, not extending political self-determination to the populations living within those possessions. Japan's administration of former German islands, American control of the Philippines and Britain's imperial holdings were treated as components of an international order to be stabilized.
The Four-Power Treaty therefore revealed a central tension in postwar diplomacy. The language of peace and cooperation could coexist with an international system built upon unequal sovereignty. The same governments that were seeking to prevent conflict among themselves were also protecting territorial arrangements established through earlier imperial expansion. [3]
Nine Powers and the Question of Chinese Sovereignty
Chinese diplomats Wellington Koo, Alfred Sze and Wang Chung-hui photographed in February 1922. Their delegation sought stronger recognition of Chinese sovereignty and the reduction of foreign privileges inherited from the unequal treaties.
If the Five-Power Treaty addressed naval strength and the Four-Power Treaty dealt with Pacific security, the Nine-Power Treaty confronted the political problem that lay behind much of the regional competition: China.
China had entered the First World War on the Allied side, hoping that participation would strengthen its position in the international system and assist its efforts to recover foreign-controlled rights. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 instead produced profound disappointment. The victorious powers allowed Germany's former treaty rights in Shandong to pass to Japan rather than returning them to Chinese control.
The decision provoked protests in China, most famously the May Fourth movement, which began with student demonstrations in Beijing and developed into a broader campaign involving students, intellectuals, merchants and workers. The controversy became a powerful symbol of the contradiction between Allied declarations about national rights and the continued application of imperial privilege.
China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles. Its position at Washington was therefore shaped by an experience in which diplomatic participation had failed to secure equal treatment.
Chinese representatives approached the new conference seeking more than assurances against future aggression. The delegation, which included Alfred Sze, Wellington Koo and Wang Chung-hui, wanted the foreign powers to reconsider the unequal treaties and special privileges that constrained China's independence. These included foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction, restrictions upon Chinese customs duties, leased territories and the presence of foreign military forces.
China's internal political fragmentation complicated its position. The republican government did not exercise effective authority throughout the country, and competing military and political leaders challenged central control. Yet those difficulties did not extinguish Chinese sovereignty or remove the grievances created by foreign intervention. Chinese diplomats argued that their country's political development required greater freedom from external restrictions, not the indefinite preservation of arrangements imposed during earlier periods of weakness.
The Nine-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, brought together the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China. It committed the foreign powers to respect China's independence, sovereignty and territorial and administrative integrity. It also endorsed equality of commercial opportunity, extending the principles of the American Open Door policy into a multilateral agreement.
The inclusion of Chinese sovereignty was significant. Rather than openly recognizing the division of China into exclusive foreign spheres, the powers endorsed principles that could be invoked against further territorial encroachment. For Chinese diplomats, the treaty offered a formal statement supporting their country's standing within international law.
But the agreement contained serious limitations.
The Open Door principle was primarily concerned with preventing one foreign power from excluding the commerce and investment of others. It did not necessarily require existing foreign privileges to be surrendered or Chinese control over its own economy to be fully restored. An arrangement could be commercially equitable among outside powers while remaining deeply unequal from the Chinese perspective.
Nor did the treaty establish a credible mechanism for compelling compliance. Its consultation provisions offered opportunities for diplomatic discussion, but no automatic sanctions or military obligations. Existing rights and concessions were not comprehensively abolished. Foreign extraterritorial privileges remained, and China did not obtain immediate customs autonomy. The conference provided for further examination of these questions rather than resolving them.
The distinction between recognizing sovereignty in principle and restoring it in practice was therefore fundamental. China gained a diplomatic statement of international support, but not the complete removal of the structures that had limited its independence for decades.
The negotiations nevertheless produced one tangible achievement. On February 4, 1922, China and Japan signed a separate agreement addressing the longstanding Shandong dispute. Japan agreed to restore the former German leased territory at Jiaozhou Bay, including Qingdao, to Chinese administration, withdraw its forces under agreed arrangements and transfer the Qingdao–Jinan railway to China under financial terms that required compensation.
The settlement corrected an especially contentious consequence of the Versailles agreement, although it did not eliminate Japanese economic influence in the region. Its importance should be understood both as a genuine Chinese diplomatic accomplishment and as a compromise negotiated within the continuing constraints of foreign power.
For Chinese nationalists, the agreements offered limited progress toward a much larger objective: recovering effective control over their country's territory, finances and legal institutions. The Washington Conference had acknowledged that China possessed sovereign rights. It had not yet created an international order prepared to enforce those rights consistently. [4]
The Stability That Negotiation Could Not Guarantee
The unfinished Japanese battleship Tosa at Nagasaki on July 31, 1922, after construction had been halted under the Washington Naval Treaty. Like unfinished American capital ships, Tosa represented the enormous naval programmes abandoned under the agreement.
The Washington Conference system enjoyed a period of genuine effectiveness during much of the 1920s. Its naval restrictions curtailed battleship construction and gave governments a framework within which to plan future fleets. The agreements also helped manage several immediate diplomatic disputes and demonstrated that major powers could negotiate limits on armaments without first suffering military defeat.
Yet the system's weaknesses became apparent as naval technology and strategic priorities evolved.
The Five-Power Treaty had concentrated heavily upon capital ships, imposing restrictions on battleships and aircraft carriers without equivalent aggregate tonnage limits across all other warship categories. Cruisers, destroyers and submarines remained areas of competition. Naval planners could pursue alternative vessels even while adhering to the treaty's principal restrictions.
The result was a new argument over what constituted an acceptable balance of naval power. Britain's worldwide imperial commitments encouraged demands for numerous cruisers to protect trade routes. American officials sought a fleet capable of operating across both the Atlantic and Pacific. Japanese planners continued to emphasize the numerical strength required for operations in East Asian waters. A limitation that appeared reasonable when measured in battleship tonnage did not necessarily satisfy each country's requirements for other classes of warships.
The powers returned to negotiations at Geneva in 1927, but failed to reach agreement. The London Naval Treaty of 1930 subsequently extended restrictions to additional categories of warships, although the negotiations again exposed disputes over ratios, prestige and strategic requirements.
Meanwhile, the wider political foundations of Pacific cooperation were deteriorating. Japan's occupation of Manchuria following the Mukden Incident in September 1931 created a direct challenge to the principles of Chinese territorial integrity that had been affirmed at Washington. Although international protests followed, the mechanisms available through the Nine-Power Treaty and the League of Nations did not compel Japan to reverse its territorial expansion.
The Manchurian crisis demonstrated the limits of a system that depended heavily upon the willingness of governments to respect negotiated principles. Naval ratios could be measured, shipbuilding programmes inspected and the characteristics of individual vessels compared against treaty requirements. Political promises concerning sovereignty were much harder to enforce when a signatory chose to act against them.
Japan formally gave notice of its intention to terminate the Washington naval treaty on December 29, 1934. The termination would take effect after December 31, 1936. By that point, the deterioration of relations among the major Pacific powers had undermined much of the political cooperation upon which the original agreements depended.
It would nevertheless be too simple to regard the Washington Conference as an inevitable failure because war followed in the next two decades. That interpretation risks treating the 1920s merely as a prelude to the Second World War rather than as a period in which governments faced several possible political futures.
The conference did not cause the later breakdown of peace, nor did it possess the power to prevent every subsequent conflict. Its limitations emerged from the political commitments that participating governments were prepared to make, the strategic inequalities they were willing to accept and the imperial arrangements they were unwilling to surrender.
For several years, negotiated restraint succeeded in reducing one of the most expensive forms of military competition. That accomplishment was historically important, even though it proved temporary. [5]
The Washington Naval Conference illustrates both the possibilities and the contradictions of interwar diplomacy. It showed that rival states could recognize the dangers of unrestricted armament and accept substantial limits upon their own military power. It also demonstrated that agreements designed to preserve stability could reinforce existing hierarchies between states, particularly when the interests of imperial powers received greater practical protection than the sovereignty of those subject to their influence.
The battleships that were never completed represented an extraordinary exercise in negotiated restraint. The unresolved disputes over China, overseas possessions and national equality revealed how much remained beyond the conference's reach.
In the end, Washington established rules for a more manageable naval competition without settling the political conflicts that made naval power seem necessary in the first place. Its achievement was real, but its durability depended upon something treaties alone could not provide: a continuing willingness to subordinate immediate national advantage to the preservation of a shared international order.
Notes and Sources
1. The origins and objectives of the conference. United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922”. See also the official conference records in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, Volume I, for the negotiations and American diplomatic position.
2. The Five-Power Treaty and naval limitations. Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, February 6, 1922, especially Articles II–X, XII and XIX. The figures used in this article are the formal replacement-tonnage ceilings established by Article IV, rather than the rounded figures sometimes used in historical summaries. For the Japanese debate, see the Australian National University Press volume Japan at War and Peace.
3. The Four-Power Treaty. Treaty Between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, December 13, 1921, including its supplementary declaration. Articles I–IV establish consultation provisions and the relationship with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
4. China and the Washington settlement. Statement by Alfred Sze on behalf of the Chinese delegation, November 16, 1921; Nine-Power Treaty, February 6, 1922; and Treaty Between Japan and China for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relative to Shantung, February 4, 1922. These primary documents distinguish China's broader demands from the narrower agreements eventually concluded.
5. The erosion of naval limitation. United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The London Naval Conference, 1930”. Japan's formal notice of termination is reproduced in the memorandum by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, December 29, 1934.
Further reading: Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922 (University of Chicago Press, 1976); Erik Goldstein and John H. Maurer, editors, The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Frank Cass, 1994); and Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Naval Institute Press, 2006).