A large crowd of Londoners gathered outside Buckingham Palace during the Armistice Day celebrations of November 1918.

Crowds gather outside Buckingham Palace on November 11, 1918, celebrating the armistice that ended fighting on the Western Front. Britain emerged victorious, but the future of its empire was already becoming a subject of political debate.

Period: 1918–1939 Region: British Empire and Commonwealth · Global

By Robert M. Dobo • WorldRecast.com

In November 1918, Britain had every reason to appear triumphant. Germany had been defeated, the Royal Navy remained a formidable force, and British representatives would sit among the most influential negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference. Across London, church bells rang and crowds celebrated the end of a war that had consumed four years and countless lives. From the imperial capital, victory seemed to confirm the strength of a worldwide system built on trade, sea power and political authority. Yet some of the people who had helped win the war were already asking an awkward question: if their sacrifices had made victory possible, why should Britain alone decide what happened next?

That question sounded different in different places. A Canadian prime minister wanted his country to speak internationally in its own right. An Irish republican rejected the idea that Westminster had any right to govern Ireland. An Indian family might mourn a soldier lost in France while hearing British officials promise political reform and authorize new restrictions on dissent. An Egyptian student could welcome the defeat of the Ottoman Empire yet resent the British soldiers still stationed in Cairo. In West Africa, people who had never elected a British minister were required to obey colonial authorities who claimed to govern in their interests. Their goals were not interchangeable, but the war had changed the terms on which they judged imperial rule.1

The paradox was that the empire was not about to disappear. It actually expanded after 1918, taking responsibility for territories formerly ruled by Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Its shipping, banks, armed forces, markets and administrative networks remained extraordinarily powerful. Nevertheless, what had once been presented as a relatively natural hierarchy now required repeated explanations, bargains and acts of coercion. Britain's victory had enlarged the empire's responsibilities while exposing the limits of its authority. Between the armistice and the outbreak of another European war in 1939, that contradiction would reshape the political world.2

An Empire Enlarged, a Promise Left Unsettled

The British Empire had never been a single country with one constitution. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South Africa enjoyed substantial internal self-government as Dominions; India was governed through a mixture of British administration and princely states; other territories were colonies, protectorates or dependencies with sharply limited political rights. The Crown provided a common symbol, but the relationship between government and governed varied enormously. A white settler parliament might negotiate with London over foreign policy while an African community in the same imperial system struggled to influence local taxes or land policy. That inequality was not an incidental flaw. It was part of how the system worked.3

The war made these differences harder to overlook. More than three million soldiers and labourers from across the empire served alongside British forces, among them Indian troops, African carriers and Caribbean servicemen. Their experiences were diverse: some volunteered, some worked under severe pressure, and many were motivated by wages, loyalty, community obligations or hopes of advancement rather than an abstract commitment to empire. At home, families endured rising prices, shortages and the absence of earners. Wartime governments spoke of common sacrifice, but that language invited people to ask what common political rights might follow. Men who had seen Europeans dependent on their labour did not necessarily return believing that Europeans possessed a natural right to rule.4

At Paris in 1919, the vocabulary of national self-determination travelled much farther than the statesmen who popularized it expected. American president Woodrow Wilson's words carried particular influence, although his programme neither promised independence to every colonized people nor displaced the interests of the victorious empires. Egyptian, Indian and other nationalist leaders nonetheless recognized an opening. They petitioned, organized and argued that the principles being applied to parts of Europe could not simply stop at the borders of Asia and Africa. When they found those doors largely closed, their disappointment became political evidence of the distance between the language of the peace settlement and the behaviour of its makers.5

Two archival photographs displayed side by side, showing a Māori meeting house and New Zealand's exhibition pavilion at Wembley in 1924.

The Māori meeting house and New Zealand Pavilion at the British Empire Exhibition, Wembley, 1924. The exhibition celebrated imperial unity while presenting selected aspects of the societies and economies Britain governed.

The settlement also added new territories to British responsibility. Tanganyika and portions of the former German Cameroons and Togoland came under British administration through the League of Nations mandate system; Britain also acquired mandates in the former Ottoman Middle East. These were not formally described as ordinary annexations. Mandates were supposed to involve international oversight and obligations toward the inhabitants, with different provisions for different territories. In practice, British officials retained broad governing powers and treated strategic routes, resources and imperial communications as essential interests. The new language of trusteeship could therefore offer critics another standard against which British conduct might be judged, even as it allowed imperial control to continue.

There was another, more cheerful version of the imperial story on display at Wembley in 1924. The British Empire Exhibition invited visitors to encounter the products, industries and cultures of a far-flung imperial world without leaving London. Its spectacle made empire seem modern, prosperous and mutually beneficial. Yet exhibitions necessarily selected what the public was meant to see. A display of tea, timber or textiles said little about the labour and land arrangements behind those commodities. The contrast between celebration at the centre and demands for rights elsewhere did not mean that ordinary Britons all shared one imperial opinion. It did show how easily imperial unity could be presented without asking the people being displayed what they wanted from the relationship.6

The Crown Could Be Shared—or Refused

Among the Dominions, the war strengthened a demand for partnership rather than immediate separation. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa had contributed troops, material and public funds on a scale that made their leaders unwilling to be treated merely as extensions of British policy. The Dominions were represented within the British Empire delegation at Paris, signed the peace treaties separately and acquired individual memberships in the League of Nations. Those arrangements did not instantly produce complete legal independence, but they made it increasingly difficult to maintain that London could automatically commit every part of the empire to every future conflict.7

The Canadian case shows how sovereignty could develop through seemingly technical questions. In 1923, Canada concluded a treaty with the United States concerning Pacific halibut without a British minister signing alongside its representative. The subject was fishing, not the fate of Europe, yet the precedent mattered: Ottawa had acted internationally on its own behalf. Canadian leaders also resisted the assumption that Britain's diplomatic commitments must automatically become Canadian ones. They did not necessarily want to abandon the Crown or the British connection; they wanted to determine the terms of that connection themselves.8

At the Imperial Conference of 1926, representatives accepted a formulation that would have startled an earlier generation of imperial officials. The Dominions were described as “autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another.” This Balfour Declaration—not to be confused with Britain's 1917 declaration concerning Palestine—recognized a relationship based increasingly on consent rather than parliamentary subordination. The Statute of Westminster, enacted on December 11, 1931, gave major parts of that settlement legal force, although its application varied among the Dominions and constitutional ties were not all severed at once.9

King George V and delegates from British Dominions pose together for an official group photograph at the 1926 Imperial Conference.

King George V with delegates to the 1926 Imperial Conference. Its declaration of equality among the self-governing Dominions marked a major constitutional change, although most colonial populations remained outside the agreement.

But the language of equality concealed a profound limit. The 1926 settlement concerned the established Dominions, not the entire population of the empire. India attended imperial discussions without receiving equivalent status. Moreover, Dominion self-government did not mean political equality for everyone living within Dominion borders. In South Africa, white minority rule rested on extensive racial exclusions. In Australia, Indigenous peoples remained subject to discrimination and dispossession; in Canada, First Nations faced the Indian Act, residential schooling and restrictions on political agency. Greater autonomy for settler governments could therefore coexist with, and sometimes strengthen, colonial power over Indigenous and non-white populations. It mattered greatly who was allowed to count as a partner. A South African official could sit at an imperial conference discussing national equality while Black South Africans remained denied a comparable voice in their own government. The contradiction did not pass unnoticed by African and Asian activists. It also raised a larger question that the conference could not answer: if the justification for Dominion autonomy was that a people should govern itself, why should that principle depend so heavily on which people the imperial system considered politically mature?10

A blackboard displayed outside a Sydney hall announces the 1938 Aboriginal Day of Mourning protest.

A sign announcing the Aboriginal Day of Mourning in Sydney, January 26, 1938. Indigenous activists challenged the exclusion and dispossession that persisted despite Australia's self-governing status within the British Empire.

Ireland exposed the limits of this constitutional compromise more violently. At the December 1918 general election, Sinn Féin won 73 of Ireland's 105 Westminster seats. Its elected members largely refused to take their places in London, instead establishing Dáil Éireann in Dublin on January 21, 1919, and asserting an independent Irish republic. British authorities rejected that claim. War followed between British forces and Irish republican fighters, with guerrilla attacks, reprisals, intelligence operations and civilian suffering. For supporters of Irish independence, the question was not how generously Westminster might delegate authority but whether Westminster possessed legitimate authority over Ireland at all.11

Men and women assembled outside Downing Street in London for a prayer vigil during Anglo-Irish negotiations in July 1921.

People gather for a prayer vigil outside Downing Street during Anglo-Irish peace negotiations in July 1921. The negotiations eventually produced a treaty that established the Irish Free State but failed to resolve Ireland's competing claims to sovereignty.

The Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 6, 1921, established the framework for an Irish Free State that came into being in December 1922 as a self-governing Dominion. But it was neither the republic many revolutionaries had sought nor a settlement accepted throughout the island. Northern Ireland, formed under the partition arrangements of 1920–21, remained within the United Kingdom; many unionists regarded that union as essential to their security and identity, while nationalists opposed partition. Disagreement over the treaty, the oath to the Crown and the extent of sovereignty helped produce the Irish Civil War of 1922–23. The war's outcome did not erase the division, nor the memories of violence on both sides.12

Ireland's story was therefore not simply an early chapter in a smooth transition to Commonwealth partnership. It showed that accommodation could arrive only after bloodshed, and that a compromise celebrated in London might be experienced elsewhere as an unfinished struggle. By the later 1930s, Irish governments were steadily reducing remaining constitutional links with Britain, while partition persisted. The same imperial monarchy could signify voluntary association to one political community and an unacceptable constraint to another. The victory of 1918 had supplied no shared answer to that difference.13

India: The Cost of a Promise

Nowhere did British imperial authority face a challenge of greater scale than in India. Almost 1.4 million men from India served in military or related wartime roles, and the subcontinent supplied money, materials and labour. The burden fell unevenly: recruitment, inflation, disease and wartime disruption affected communities differently, while Indian political leaders differed over how much support Britain deserved. Some expected loyal service to accelerate constitutional progress. Others regarded even the promise of eventual self-government as inadequate. The war had made India's importance to British power undeniable, without settling who should possess power within India.14

In 1917, the British government announced the aim of increasing Indian participation in government, and the Government of India Act of 1919 introduced a restricted system of provincial responsibility known as dyarchy. Elected Indian ministers received certain portfolios, but essential powers—including much of finance, policing and the central executive—remained under British control. Almost simultaneously, the Rowlatt legislation allowed exceptional restrictions on suspected political activity to continue after the war. To Indians expecting freedom as a reward for sacrifice, the combination was bitterly revealing: Britain offered carefully measured reform while retaining the means to suppress opposition.15

On April 13, 1919, British troops under Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer fired on a crowd gathered at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar. The gathering included people protesting repressive measures as well as visitors present during a major festival. The official British inquiry counted 379 dead; other estimates were much higher, and the true toll remains disputed. What was beyond dispute was the killing of unarmed people in an enclosed public space and the harsh punitive measures imposed in Punjab. For many Indians, Amritsar became a point beyond which claims that imperial government was ultimately benevolent could no longer be accepted. The episode also provoked argument within Britain over violence, race and responsibility.16

Mohandas Gandhi transformed that anger into a broader politics of non-cooperation, joined for a time by Muslim activists engaged in the Khilafat movement. Boycotts of British goods and institutions encouraged people to reconsider their daily participation in colonial rule. The movement crossed some barriers of language, class and religious affiliation without dissolving them. After protesters killed police officers at Chauri Chaura in February 1922, Gandhi suspended the campaign, fearing that violence would destroy its moral basis. Not all nationalists agreed with his decision or methods. Indian politics also included constitutional reformers, revolutionaries, labour organizers, peasant associations, leaders of oppressed castes and competing visions of religious and regional representation.17

Gandhi bends near the shore at Dandi while fellow campaigners stand behind him during the Salt March of 1930.

Mohandas Gandhi at Dandi on April 5, 1930, during the Salt March. The campaign challenged British taxation and transformed an everyday necessity into a symbol of India's struggle for self-government.

In 1930, Gandhi's march to the sea challenged the government monopoly on salt, choosing a commodity that connected imperial taxation with ordinary cooking and survival. Women became increasingly prominent in civil disobedience, while Indian businesses, students and villagers weighed the risks of protest against arrest and lost income. The Government of India Act of 1935 later expanded provincial autonomy, and elections in 1937 allowed Indian parties to exercise significant responsibilities in several provinces. Yet the central structure remained under imperial safeguards, and the proposed all-India federation was never implemented. By 1939, the argument was no longer merely about whether Indians could administer selected departments. It concerned the right of Indians to determine their political future and the difficult question of what kind of state that future should produce. This second question was not an afterthought. B. R. Ambedkar and other critics warned against treating freedom from British control as sufficient if caste oppression remained intact. Muslim leaders debated safeguards, representation and the prospect of political arrangements in which their communities might be outvoted. These disputes were not simply obstacles placed in the path of an otherwise united nation. They reflected real disagreements about who would exercise authority after the British did not.18

The Middle East and the Limits of Independence

Egypt's postwar turmoil began with a demand that sounded entirely reasonable to its supporters: Egyptians wanted to represent Egypt at the peace conference. Britain had occupied the country since 1882 and declared a protectorate in 1914. When Saad Zaghlul and other leaders of the Wafd movement pressed their case, British authorities arrested and exiled them in March 1919. Demonstrations spread through cities and rural districts. Students, railway workers, civil servants, farmers and others disrupted the ordinary business of government. This was not merely an argument among politicians in Cairo; it was a struggle over who had the right to speak for an entire country.19

A group of Egyptian nationalist demonstrators gathered outdoors in Cairo during the revolution of 1919.

Egyptian nationalists demonstrate in Cairo in March 1919. The uprising against British authority brought students, workers, farmers and women into a widespread campaign for national independence.

Britain declared Egypt independent on February 28, 1922, but reserved powers concerning imperial communications, defence, foreign interests and minorities, and Sudan. The 1923 constitution created a parliamentary framework, yet British influence remained decisive in sensitive affairs, and political conflict continued among the monarchy, Wafd politicians and imperial authorities. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 altered the relationship again, permitting a continuing British military presence in the Suez Canal zone and leaving Sudan's future unresolved. For Egyptians, independence had become a process of disputing what independence actually meant. The legal change was real; so were its limits.20

Farther east, Britain confronted the consequences of wartime promises and postwar strategic ambition in Iraq. Arab political expectations, British interests in oil and communications, and the League's mandate arrangements were difficult to reconcile. A major rebellion in 1920 brought together varied Iraqi groups, including tribal forces and Sunni and Shi'a participants, although their purposes and loyalties were not identical. Britain crushed the revolt at considerable cost and increasingly relied on air power and negotiated local authority to maintain influence. Faisal became king in 1921, but the new monarchy operated under heavy British supervision. Iraqi nationalists continued to challenge the assumption that the defeat of Ottoman rule had merely transferred the right to decide their future to another foreign power.21

A large assembly of Palestinian Arab men, some wearing keffiyehs, raises their hands during a gathering at Abu Ghosh in 1936.

Palestinian Arabs gather at Abu Ghosh in 1936, during the period of the Arab Revolt against British rule and immigration and land policies associated with the Zionist national project. The gathering illustrates the mass political mobilization that challenged Britain's mandate.

Iraq entered the League of Nations as an independent state in 1932 after a treaty that preserved significant British military and strategic privileges. That outcome was not fictitious: Iraqi institutions acquired an international legal position that had previously been denied them. But it was not unconstrained sovereignty either. Palestine presented an even sharper and unresolved contradiction. Britain's mandate incorporated its 1917 commitment to a Jewish national home while also requiring protection of the rights of the country's existing inhabitants. Palestinian Arabs demanded national independence and opposed policies they believed threatened their political future; Zionist Jews pursued national aspirations shaped increasingly by persecution in Europe. Violence in 1929 and the Palestinian Arab revolt of 1936–39 exposed the failure of British administration to reconcile those claims. British counterinsurgency suppressed the revolt but did not settle the underlying conflict.22

From Nairobi to Kingston, the Empire Answered Back

Across Africa, resistance often began not with a declaration of independence but with a grievance that reached directly into a household: the loss of farmland, a new tax, a pass requirement, compulsory labour or an unaccountable local official. Colonial governments justified their rule through promises of order and development. They built railways, schools and administrative systems, but those projects frequently served exporters, settlers and officials before the people who paid for them. Africans could seek education and use colonial institutions to press claims while simultaneously resisting the racial hierarchy those institutions enforced. There was no single African response to empire, and no reason to expect the same kind of protest everywhere.23

An archival press photograph documenting the Prince of Wales's visit to the British Gold Coast colony in 1925.

The Prince of Wales's visit to Britain's Gold Coast colony, now Ghana, in 1925. Royal tours helped project an image of imperial unity even as Africans increasingly challenged colonial inequalities and restrictions on political representation.

In Kenya, settlers' demands for land and labour placed heavy pressure on African communities. Harry Thuku emerged as an early organizer against forced labour, taxation and the pass system. His arrest in March 1922 brought demonstrators into Nairobi, where security forces opened fire. Women were prominent among those who challenged officials, not simply as supporters of male politicians but as people resisting the exploitation of their own work and families. Indian residents of Kenya were also contesting racial restrictions, sometimes in ways that intersected with African campaigns and sometimes in competition over political rights. The empire's racial order created divisions, but it could also make different groups recognize a shared problem.24

In southeastern Nigeria, the Women's War of 1929 revealed just how badly an administration could misunderstand the political institutions it claimed to govern. Thousands of women organized against feared taxation, abuses associated with warrant chiefs and the erosion of their influence over trade and community affairs. They used meetings, collective pressure, songs and forms of protest rooted in local practice. Colonial officers frequently described the uprising as a riot, a word that diminished its political purpose. Security forces killed women during the suppression of the movement. The protests nevertheless forced investigations and changes in aspects of local administration, showing that people excluded from colonial councils could still compel the government to respond. The movement also complicates the idea that political awakening necessarily began in schools or legislative chambers. Many participants drew on traditions of women's collective authority that predated British rule. They were defending practical forms of power—over markets, households and the conduct of local officials—that colonial administrators had failed to recognize. This was not merely a rehearsal for later male-led nationalist parties. It was a political struggle in its own right.25

Other Africans worked through newspapers, petitions and organizations linking different territories. The National Congress of British West Africa, founded in 1920, sought expanded representation and reforms across the region. In London, the West African Students' Union, established in 1925, gave students and activists a place to exchange ideas, challenge racist assumptions and imagine a political future beyond colonial paternalism. These networks did not always call immediately for complete independence. Some demanded the rights that Britain claimed to associate with modern government; others were moving toward more radical conclusions. The significance lay partly in the widening circle of people who insisted they were entitled to debate imperial policy at all.26

South Africa made the empire's contradictions especially visible. Its government possessed Dominion autonomy, but most Black South Africans were excluded from meaningful national political power. Land segregation introduced before the war was tightened through later legislation, while African unions, civic associations and political organizations protested restrictions on work, residence and rights. In 1936, legislation removed the remaining African voters in the Cape from the common electoral roll and entrenched a system of separate representation; companion land legislation reinforced segregated territorial arrangements. To describe South Africa's greater independence from Britain as an uncomplicated advance of freedom would be to overlook whose freedom remained constrained.27

The Caribbean had its own history of coerced labour, emancipation, plantation wealth and political exclusion. Veterans returning from the Great War brought expectations shaped by their service and by the racial discrimination many had encountered. During the 1930s, falling commodity prices and chronic poverty sharpened disputes over wages, unemployment, housing and health. Strikes and disturbances swept through several British Caribbean colonies, including Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica. Workers in sugar fields, on docks and in oil production demanded changes that colonial legislatures dominated by property and commercial interests had repeatedly failed to provide.28

The unrest of 1937–38 helped force Britain to appoint the West India Royal Commission, better known as the Moyne Commission, to investigate living conditions. Its findings exposed serious social deprivation and helped prepare the ground for a changed approach to colonial welfare, although most of the report was not made public until after the next world war had begun. The protest movements also strengthened trade unions and mass political organizations. For ordinary Caribbean people, the question of empire was rarely only about which flag flew above a governor's residence. It was about whether wages could feed a family, whether a child could receive an education and whether the government considered the poor worth listening to.29

The Depression and the Search for an Imperial Shelter

All these disputes unfolded within an increasingly strained economy. Britain emerged from the war burdened by debt and industrial difficulties, even while London remained a centre of global finance. The world slump after 1929 damaged demand for exports and pushed down the prices of agricultural and mineral products on which many colonial producers depended. A fall in the price of cocoa, sugar or another cash crop could be catastrophic to families required to pay taxes in money. It also narrowed the resources of governments that claimed they could deliver prosperity through imperial development. In many places, the Depression made longstanding arguments about political power inseparable from the price of everyday necessities.30

The ocean liner Empress of Britain moored in Québec harbour during the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference.

The Canadian Pacific liner Empress of Britain in Québec harbour on July 19, 1932, for the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa. The gathering sought to strengthen economic connections within the empire during the Great Depression.

After Britain left the gold standard in September 1931, imperial economic cooperation appeared to some policymakers as a way to preserve influence and protect trade. The Ottawa agreements of 1932 extended systems of preferential tariffs among participating parts of the empire. Supporters imagined a more closely knit economic community, with imperial markets offering shelter from global instability. But Dominion governments bargained to protect their own farmers and industries, while colonies had far less leverage and could remain dependent on a narrow range of exports. Economic cooperation might strengthen connections among governments already enjoying considerable autonomy without resolving the unequal conditions under which colonial subjects worked and traded. This was one reason imperial preference could look so different depending on where a person stood. A Canadian producer might see a protected British market as an opportunity, a British consumer might worry about prices, and a colonial farmer might discover that the value of a harvest still depended on distant merchants and markets. The language of an imperial economic family did not remove the fact that its members entered negotiations with dramatically unequal power.31

The Victory That Changed the Meaning of Empire

The British Empire of 1939 was still immense, and its eventual disintegration after the Second World War should not be projected backward as an obvious certainty. British officials retained considerable military, financial and administrative power. Some colonial subjects valued particular imperial institutions or hoped for gradual reform; some Dominion politicians wanted closer cooperation, not separation. Nationalist movements were divided by class, religion, region, strategy and competing visions of citizenship. The interwar years did not produce a single march toward independence. They produced a growing number of struggles over who could legitimately claim authority, on what terms, and for whose benefit.32

Yet the change in political language was lasting. The war had helped popularize ideas of national rights, representative government and international responsibility, even though imperial states applied those principles selectively. Activists learned to use that contradiction. Petitions to international bodies, boycotts, constitutional negotiations, labour organizing and mass demonstrations became ways to insist that colonial populations were political communities rather than passive recipients of European government. They also showed that sovereignty was more than a legal document. It involved the capacity to determine foreign policy, control resources, make laws, protect rights and decide whose interests a government served.33

The memory of this period differs according to where it is told. In Britain, the postwar empire has often appeared in accounts of sacrifice, diplomatic achievement or an evolving Commonwealth. In Ireland, India, Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and the Caribbean, the same years can be remembered through repression, protest, constitutional invention and the daily labour of people left outside official celebrations. The strongest history must make room for both the reality of Britain's wartime victory and the agency of those who challenged the order that victory sustained. It must also give ordinary people more than a supporting role. A dockworker who joined a strike, a woman who confronted a warrant chief, a student who carried a petition and a soldier who returned to find his community unchanged each made a political judgement about the imperial relationship. Those judgements, multiplied across continents, altered what governments could expect to get away with. It must also recognize that national independence, where achieved, did not automatically settle questions of class, gender, land or minority rights.

There was a further consequence. Britain increasingly had to defend empire in the language of welfare, partnership and international obligation rather than rely solely on claims of prestige and conquest. Sometimes this produced meaningful reforms; at other times it offered fresh justifications for old inequalities. The Commonwealth idea, the language of trusteeship and new development policies all carried traces of arguments made during these years. They could open political possibilities without erasing differences in power. By 1939, Britain's empire had not lost the ability to command, but it could no longer assume that command would be accepted as legitimate simply because Britain had won a war. Victory had preserved the empire. It had also helped make the case for changing it—or leaving it—impossible to silence.

Sources and Further Reading

  • Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics (University of California Press, 2005).

  • O. Nigel Bolland, On the March: Labour Rebellions in the British Caribbean, 1934–39 (Ian Randle Publishers, 1995).

  • Judith M. Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope (Yale University Press, 1989).

  • John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

  • Saul Dubow, Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36 (Macmillan, 1989).

  • Toyin Falola and Adam Paddock, eds., The Women's War of 1929: A History of Anti-Colonial Resistance in Eastern Nigeria (Carolina Academic Press, 2011).

  • Ronald Hyam, Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

  • Matthew Hughes, Britain's Pacification of Palestine: The British Army, the Colonial State, and the Arab Revolt, 1936–1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

  • Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2007).

  • Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford University Press, 2015).

  • Susan Pedersen, “Getting Out of Iraq—in 1932: The League of Nations and the Road to Normative Statehood,” American Historical Review 115, no. 4 (2010): 975–1000.

  • The National Archives (UK), “Loyalty and Dissent”.