Delegates assemble in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles on June 28, 1919, for the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The settlement with Germany formed part of the wider restructuring of Europe following the collapse of its old imperial powers.
Period: 1917–1924, with consequences throughout the interwar years
Region: Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, Anatolia and the Middle East
By Robert M. Dobo • WorldRecast.com
In 1914, a traveller could cross much of Europe and western Asia without leaving the dominions of four ruling houses. The Romanovs governed an empire stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific. The Habsburgs presided over a patchwork of peoples along the Danube and beyond. The Hohenzollerns ruled a powerful, industrialized Germany, while the Ottoman sultan's government still claimed territories linking southeastern Europe, Anatolia and the Arab provinces. Their borders were different, their political institutions were different, and their subjects held very different ideas about what it meant to belong. Yet each dynasty appeared to possess something that governments prize: continuity. A monarch died; another took the throne; the state endured.
Within a few years, all four ruling orders had fallen. Nicholas II abdicated in March 1917. Kaiser Wilhelm II lost his throne in November 1918. The Habsburg monarchy disintegrated that autumn, even before the diplomats sat down to determine the peace. The Ottoman sultanate survived military defeat only to be abolished in November 1922. These endings did not produce one kind of beginning. Germany became a republic within a largely surviving national framework. Austria-Hungary broke into competing successor states. Revolutionary Russia eventually became the Soviet Union. The Ottoman lands were divided between a new Turkish state and territories governed, at first, largely under British and French authority.1
It is tempting to tell this story through maps: four enormous blocks shrinking, smaller states appearing in their place. But a map cannot show what happened when an official's pension came from a government that no longer existed, when a family found its language newly classified as foreign, or when a soldier returned home to discover that home belonged to another country. The collapse of empire meant liberation for many people, dispossession for others, and profound uncertainty for most. What replaced the four monarchies was not a single new order but an argument, fought in parliaments and streets and on battlefields, over who had the right to rule.2
Crowns That Had Already Begun to Crack
None of these empires was simply an antique institution waiting to be swept away. Germany had an elected Reichstag, influential parties, major trade unions and a thriving scientific and industrial economy, although the emperor, military leadership and unelected elements of government retained formidable power. Austria-Hungary combined constitutional politics with dynastic authority: the Austrian and Hungarian halves operated differently, and the political weight of a Czech industrial worker was not the same as that of a Hungarian landowner or a Bosnian peasant. The Russian tsar had conceded a parliament after the revolution of 1905, but repeatedly restricted its influence. Ottoman reformers had restored constitutional government in 1908, only for war, political crisis and the authoritarian rule of the Committee of Union and Progress to narrow the possibilities of pluralism.3
Their subjects were no less varied than their institutions. In the Habsburg lands, people could be attached to local communities and the imperial state while arguing fiercely about schools, jobs and the language of administration. A resident of Sarajevo might be Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Catholic or Jewish without thinking of those identities as fitting neatly into a future national border. The Romanov Empire contained Ukrainians, Poles, Finns, Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Central Asian peoples and many others, subject to unequal policies of imperial rule. The Ottoman Empire embraced Turkish, Arab, Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, Jewish and other communities whose political demands were never uniform. Nationalism mattered greatly before 1914; so did religion, class, region, dynasty and the ordinary desire to live safely.4
The First World War strained these arrangements almost beyond recognition. Governments demanded soldiers, food, taxes and labour on a scale few had imagined. Blockades, requisitions, inflation and failing transport made cities hungry and villages resentful. Military officers acquired extraordinary authority, while censorship and suspicion turned differences of language or ancestry into supposed threats to security. Victories could briefly restore confidence, but they could not undo the cumulative losses. War also created expectations: after years of sacrifice, workers wanted a voice, peasants wanted land, soldiers wanted peace, and political movements wanted recognition. The language of national self-determination circulated alongside promises of social revolution.5
Defeat did not operate like a switch. Russia's monarchy fell while its armies were still fighting. Austria-Hungary began to dissolve from within as its battlefield position collapsed. German revolutionaries challenged an imperial government that had already lost the military initiative. The Ottoman state, defeated in 1918, continued to possess a sultan and government while rival authorities contested its future. Nor did the surviving British and French empires surrender their own colonial possessions when they endorsed the aspirations of some European nationalities. The question after 1918 was therefore not whether empire had suddenly become impossible. It was which empires would survive, which populations would govern themselves, and who would decide the difference.6
Russia: The Revolution That Did Not End at the Palace
In Petrograd, the Romanov order collapsed amid bread queues, demonstrations and mutiny. The protests that began in the Russian calendar's February 1917 grew from wartime misery into a challenge the state could no longer contain. Women workers were prominent in the early demonstrations; other workers joined them, and soldiers increasingly refused to suppress the crowds. Nicholas II abdicated on March 15 by the calendar used in Western Europe. The fact that a dynasty had ruled for more than three centuries could no longer compensate for its failure to feed cities, command confidence or maintain obedience in the army. Yet the disappearance of the tsar settled almost nothing about the power that would follow.7
Women demonstrate in Petrograd on March 8, 1917, demanding relief from wartime hardship. Their participation helped ignite the February Revolution that brought more than three centuries of Romanov rule to an end.
A Provisional Government emerged from parliamentary politics, while workers' and soldiers' councils—soviets—claimed authority from those who had made the revolution possible. Both spoke in the name of a transformed Russia, but they did not agree about how quickly land should be redistributed, who should control factories or whether the war should continue. The government preserved Russia's commitment to the Allies, with disastrous consequences for its popularity. Lenin's Bolsheviks gained support by demanding peace and land and by insisting that political power pass to the soviets. In November 1917—October under the old Russian calendar—they overthrew the Provisional Government in Petrograd. What followed was not an immediate transfer of popular power to an agreed constitutional system but another struggle to determine who could speak for the revolution.8
That struggle exposed a central contradiction. Bolshevik leaders claimed to govern in the interests of workers and peasants, yet they were unwilling to accept electoral defeat when the nationwide Constituent Assembly, chosen in late 1917, failed to deliver them a majority. They dispersed it in January 1918. The government also faced real armed enemies, foreign intervention, administrative breakdown and an economy coming apart. The resulting civil wars involved Bolshevik Red armies, several divided White movements, peasant insurgents, regional governments and national independence forces. Each pursued different aims. There was no single anti-Bolshevik alternative waiting to restore democracy, nor did every opponent of the Reds wish to restore the tsar.9
A displaced family with a cart in the Samara region during the Russian famine of 1921. Civil war, disrupted agriculture, requisitioning and drought combined to leave millions facing hunger and displacement.
For civilians, these distinctions did not necessarily reduce the danger. Requisitioning took grain from villages already suffering shortages. Epidemics spread along disrupted transport routes. Red and White forces used terror, while anti-Jewish pogroms, particularly in Ukraine, killed and uprooted communities. Most pogroms were committed by anti-Bolshevik armies and irregular forces, though some Red Army units also participated. The great famine of 1921–1922 deepened a catastrophe produced by war, drought, coercive economic policies and shattered trade. The Bolsheviks ultimately prevailed in much of the former empire because they controlled central territories and key railways, organized military resources more effectively than their opponents, and confronted enemies who were divided politically and geographically. Their victory preserved a powerful state, but at an immense human cost.10
The imperial frontier, meanwhile, had become a series of unresolved questions. Finland declared independence in December 1917; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania eventually secured independence through war and diplomacy. Poland returned to the map, although its eastern limits were fought over rather than simply discovered. Ukrainians declared competing forms of statehood and fought Bolsheviks, Whites, Polish forces and one another. In the Caucasus, Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani republics emerged in 1918, only to be absorbed into Soviet power in the following years. To describe these regions merely as provinces that 'broke away' would be to overlook their own political movements and their differing experiences of imperial domination.11
On December 30, 1922, representatives of Soviet Russia, Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belarus and the Transcaucasian Soviet federation formally established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The new state's language acknowledged republics and nationalities rather than openly restoring the Romanov crown. National cultures and institutions sometimes received official support, especially in the early Soviet period, but meaningful sovereignty was limited by Communist Party control, centralized coercive institutions and military realities. The Soviet Union was neither the old empire with a red flag nor a clean break from imperial patterns. It combined a genuinely revolutionary social and ideological programme with the reconstruction of authority over much of the former imperial space. That tension would shape its entire history.12
The Habsburgs: When the Centre Could No Longer Hold
Austria-Hungary's end is often presented as the inevitable fate of a state containing too many nationalities. That account is tidier than the history. Before the war, many people sought greater language rights, federal reform or autonomy without necessarily wanting the monarchy abolished. Its bureaucracy, railways, law courts, universities and commercial networks connected territories that had become deeply interdependent. The Habsburg state could be frustrating and unequal; it also provided a political framework within which local interests could negotiate. Historians have increasingly emphasized that the empire's collapse must be explained through the brutalizing experience of the war, rather than treated as the automatic consequence of ethnic diversity.13
By 1918, shortages and exhaustion had stripped the dynasty of much of its authority. Emperor Charles attempted to preserve the Austrian half of the monarchy by offering federal reform in October, but the initiative arrived after national leaders had begun to organize independent governments. In Prague, Czechoslovakia was proclaimed on October 28. In the South Slav lands, political leaders severed ties with Vienna and Budapest; the emerging State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs would soon unite with Serbia. In Budapest, the Chrysanthemum Revolution brought Mihály Károlyi to power. On November 12, crowds gathered outside Vienna's parliament for the proclamation of the republic of German-Austria. The monarchy had ceased to function before the peace conference could formally rearrange its territory.14
Crowds gather in Prague on October 28, 1918, as Czechoslovakia declares independence from Habsburg rule. These contemporary photographs capture the celebrations accompanying the creation of the new state.
The new Czechoslovakia represented a remarkable political success for Czech and Slovak nation-builders, including Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Beneš. It also revealed how difficult it was to transform the principle of nationality into a border. The country included large German-speaking communities in Bohemia and Moravia, Hungarians in Slovakia, as well as Jews, Poles and Ruthenians. Many Slovaks expected a degree of autonomy that the centralizing leadership in Prague did not readily provide. Czechoslovakia developed a functioning parliamentary democracy and significant civic institutions, but its national settlement was not identical with the wishes of everyone living within it. The state that liberated some people from Habsburg rule became, for others, a government run by another linguistic and political majority.15
Farther south, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed on December 1, 1918, joining the existing Serbian monarchy with former Habsburg territories and other South Slav lands. The aspiration to political union was real, especially among people who had suffered under imperial divisions. So were anxieties about whether the kingdom would be a partnership of peoples or a state dominated by institutions centred in Belgrade. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population's religious and political diversity did not disappear when imperial administration ended. Croatia's advocates of autonomy, Serbian supporters of centralization and other movements carried their arguments into the new kingdom. A country created in the name of unity still had to decide what unity meant.16
An immense crowd gathers outside the Austrian parliament in Vienna on November 12, 1918, for the proclamation of the Republic of German-Austria. Vienna had been the capital of a vast multinational monarchy; it was now the centre of a much smaller state.
Austria and Hungary experienced the breakup differently. Vienna, once the centre of a vast empire, found itself the capital of a small republic separated from much of the agricultural and industrial hinterland on which it depended. Many German-speaking Austrians favoured union with Germany; the peace settlement prohibited it. Hungary lost extensive territories under the Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920. Many lands transferred to Romania, Czechoslovakia and the South Slav kingdom had non-Hungarian majorities, but the new boundaries also placed roughly three million ethnic Hungarians outside Hungary. The sense of national injury became a major force in Hungarian politics, especially after the brief Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 gave way to counterrevolution and the conservative regency of Miklós Horthy.17
Even the supposedly straightforward recovery of national homelands involved bitter conflicts. Poland re-emerged as a sovereign state after more than a century of partition, but Poles and Ukrainians fought over Eastern Galicia, including Lviv, and Poland and Soviet Russia fought a wider war that ended with the Treaty of Riga in March 1921. Romania expanded into territories with substantial Hungarian and German populations. Italy acquired former Habsburg lands inhabited by Slovenes and Croats as well as Italians. The peace treaties of Saint-Germain in 1919 and Trianon in 1920 gave legal form to many changes already made by local revolution, armies and occupation. The old imperial problem of governing diverse communities had not vanished. It had been redistributed among states with more emphatically national names.18
Germany: A Republic Built Inside an Empire's Walls
Germany's transformation followed a different path. Its national state, created in 1871 under Prussian leadership, was not carved into a dozen successor countries. The Hohenzollern dynasty fell, the other German monarchies disappeared, and Germany lost territory and its overseas colonies, but most of its central institutions and population remained within a single republic. The immediate catalyst was military defeat. As the army's position collapsed in late 1918, naval officers planned an operation that sailors regarded as a futile sacrifice. Mutiny at Kiel developed into a movement of workers' and soldiers' councils. Demonstrations spread, and on November 9 the monarchy fell. Friedrich Ebert, a Social Democrat, became the central figure in the provisional government.19
Crowds gather outside Berlin's Reichstag during the German Revolution of November 1918. On November 9, Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed a German republic as the Hohenzollern monarchy collapsed.
That day did not settle whether Germany would become a parliamentary democracy, a socialist council republic or something else. Majority Social Democrats feared that uncontrolled revolution would bring civil war and further hunger; their more radical opponents believed that the old elites would survive unless economic and military power were fundamentally transformed. The new leadership reached understandings with army officers and relied in part on existing administrative structures. These decisions helped maintain order and arrange demobilization, but they also preserved institutions and attitudes hostile to the republican experiment. Political violence intensified in 1919, including the suppression of left-wing uprisings by government troops and right-wing paramilitaries.20
The republic nevertheless achieved changes that had once appeared distant. Women gained national voting rights in November 1918 and participated in the election to a constituent National Assembly on January 19, 1919. The Weimar Constitution, signed in August, established a parliamentary system, a directly elected president and important civil and social rights. It removed inherited political privileges and recognized men and women as formally equal in fundamental civic rights. Trade unions, cultural innovators and reformers found new opportunities. A working woman casting her first national ballot was experiencing a real alteration in the distribution of power, whatever uncertainties surrounded the new state.21
Election preparations in Frankfurt's Kaisersaal in 1919. The new German republic introduced a radically expanded national electorate, including women voting in national elections for the first time.
The Treaty of Versailles complicated that experiment. Signed in June 1919, it imposed territorial losses, disarmament provisions, reparations obligations and responsibility clauses that became targets of fierce resentment. Germany's colonial empire was removed, but colonial peoples did not thereby receive independence: most territories passed under League of Nations mandates administered by victorious powers. At home, opponents of democracy spread the false claim that the army had been undefeated in the field and betrayed by civilians. The republic inherited defeat, and its enemies sought to make republican politicians personally responsible for the terms of peace.22
Weimar's future was not prewritten. A right-wing putsch in March 1920 failed in the face of a general strike; a severe inflationary crisis in 1923 damaged savings and trust, but the following years also brought cultural achievement, relative stabilization and democratic political life. The republic's weaknesses were serious: entrenched anti-democratic elites, social division, constitutional vulnerabilities and recurrent political violence. Yet its later destruction by the Nazis in 1933 should not erase the possibilities that Germans fought over after 1918. Of the four empires, Germany most clearly demonstrated that removing a monarch did not necessarily remove the state's administrative, military or social foundations. Whether those foundations supported democracy depended on what people did next.23
The Ottomans: Defeat, Occupation and a Second Founding
Mustafa Kemal Pasha addresses the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara on March 1, 1921. The assembly had become the political centre of resistance to the postwar partition of Ottoman territory and would form the institutional foundation of the Turkish republic.
The Ottoman Empire had been changing long before its final defeat. The constitutional revolution of 1908 promised a reinvigorated political order; the Italian war of 1911–1912 and Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 then stripped away territory and brought waves of Muslim refugees into Anatolia. The First World War multiplied these losses. Ottoman forces fought on fronts from Gallipoli to Mesopotamia and the Caucasus, while the government's wartime suspicion of minority communities became catastrophic. In 1915–1916, the Committee of Union and Progress regime carried out the Armenian genocide through mass killing, deportation and the deliberate creation of lethal conditions. Other Christian communities, including Assyrians and Ottoman Greeks, also suffered severe violence and displacement. Any account of Ottoman collapse that centres only on Turkish national survival misses those whose lives and communities were destroyed.24
The Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, ended Ottoman participation in the war but not the contest over its territory. Allied forces occupied strategic locations, and Istanbul came under increasing Allied control. Greek troops landed at İzmir in May 1919, intensifying resistance in western Anatolia. The Ottoman sultan's government remained in the capital, but its ability to speak for the population was increasingly challenged by a nationalist movement associated with Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk. The movement drew heavily on Muslim communities, officers and officials who feared occupation and partition. It was not, however, simply a democratic uprising of everyone once governed by the empire; its definition of the nation created sharp limits for some of Anatolia's inhabitants.25
Greek refugees wait beside ships at Smyrna, now İzmir, in September 1922. The destruction and displacement accompanying the Greco–Turkish War preceded the compulsory population exchange agreed in January 1923.
The Treaty of Sèvres, signed by representatives of the Ottoman government in August 1920, proposed severe restrictions on the remaining state and extensive territorial arrangements favourable to the victorious Allies and their partners. Turkish nationalists rejected it, and it never became an effective final settlement. From Ankara, the Grand National Assembly challenged the authority of the Istanbul government and directed a military and political struggle against occupying forces and rival claimants. Success against Greek armies in 1922 strengthened the Ankara leadership. The assembly abolished the sultanate on November 1, 1922, ending the Ottoman monarchy before peace negotiations produced the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on October 29, 1923; the caliphate, temporarily retained as a separate institution, was abolished in March 1924.26
The new Turkish republic represented a striking assertion of independence against the partition envisaged at Sèvres. Its leaders sought a secular, sovereign and administratively centralized state, with Ankara rather than Istanbul as the capital. Later reforms transformed law, education, public symbolism and relations between religious institutions and government. Yet there was also continuity. Military officers, bureaucratic traditions and political networks from the late Ottoman world helped build the republic. Kurdish communities, whose circumstances and aspirations varied, were not granted a separate national state; the centralizing republic increasingly resisted distinct Kurdish political claims. Turkish national sovereignty was real, but not all communities enjoyed equal power to define it.27
For people of the former Arab provinces, Ottoman defeat brought another set of outcomes. Arab wartime movements had challenged Ottoman rule, and some leaders expected independence in return for their contribution to the Allied cause. An Arab government was established in Damascus, only to be overthrown by French forces in 1920. The San Remo decisions of that year allocated Syria and Lebanon to French administration, and Palestine and Mesopotamia to British administration under the emerging mandates system; Transjordan later developed as a separate British-administered territory. Britain fostered Hashemite monarchies in Iraq and Transjordan, while different political arrangements took shape elsewhere. These developments were neither a direct continuation of Ottoman government nor the unfettered independence many inhabitants had sought.28
Perhaps the starkest human symbol of the new order was the compulsory Greek–Turkish population exchange agreed in January 1923. The convention categorized people principally by religion: Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals and Muslim Greek nationals were to be transferred, with specified exceptions, including most of Istanbul's Greek Orthodox community and the Muslims of Western Thrace. Roughly 1.6 million people were encompassed by the wider displacement and exchange process, although many had fled before the convention took effect. Homes, shops, fields and graves were left behind. Politicians could call the result a more stable national settlement; families forced to depart experienced it as the destruction of an everyday world.29
New Borders, Old Habits of Power
Palestinian Arab demonstrators gather at Damascus Gate in Jerusalem on March 8, 1920, amid demands for political independence and regional unity. The future of Palestine and the former Ottoman Arab provinces remained contested as Britain and France established their postwar mandates.
Self-determination became one of the most influential political ideas of the postwar settlement, but it was never applied with perfect consistency. The Paris peace negotiations recognized some national claims while rejecting or postponing others. A Czech or Polish delegation could present a claim to independence in language that resonated with the victorious powers. An Arab delegation, a Kurdish nationalist or a representative from a colonized population faced a different balance of interests and authority. Strategic railways, ports, defensible frontiers, economic viability and the preferences of Britain, France and their partners frequently mattered as much as locally expressed wishes.30
The practical difficulty was not simply diplomatic hypocrisy, though there was plenty of that. People were not arranged in conveniently separate national blocks. A town might contain several languages, different religious congregations and families whose loyalties shifted according to circumstances. Even apparently precise census figures rested on choices about whether to record a person's language, religion or declared nationality. Drawing a border around one majority almost always left a minority on the other side. The democratic promise of national government therefore depended on how the new states treated people who did not belong to their preferred national story.31
Some societies responded with expanded citizenship, land reform, women's participation and new educational opportunities. Others experienced military rule, exclusion, censorship or political violence. In Hungary, the fear of revolution helped consolidate conservative authoritarian government. In Soviet Russia, a revolution proclaiming social equality established a one-party political monopoly. Turkey's republic pursued a sweeping programme of modernization without embracing open party competition on equal terms. Germany and Czechoslovakia sustained more pluralist democratic institutions for much of the 1920s, though each faced its own exclusions and pressures. The destruction of dynastic legitimacy opened political possibilities; it did not guarantee liberal democracy.32
War also outlasted the treaties. Soldiers turned into irregular fighters, communities defended disputed towns, and refugees tried to find relatives in unfamiliar states. Women often bore the burden of keeping households alive amid missing wages and absent or dead men, even as some gained new political rights. Former imperial civil servants had to decide whom to serve; teachers confronted new prescribed languages and histories. A line drawn across a map could change a person's passport more quickly than it changed the economy or the neighbourhood. The most enduring reconstruction was not merely territorial. It was the slow, contested remaking of institutions, loyalties and daily life.33
The Empires That Refused to Disappear
The fall of the four dynasties transformed the political vocabulary of the twentieth century. Crown, dynasty and hereditary allegiance lost ground to republic, nation, revolution and citizenship. But the results were uneven because the institutions of empire could not be abolished simply by replacing a ruler. Railways, armies, tax systems and administrative habits survived. So did older hierarchies of wealth, religion and language. The Soviet state adopted a revolutionary ideology while governing a vast multinational territory; Turkey forged a national republic with much of the personnel and experience of the late Ottoman administration; the German republic inherited institutions that could protect it or undermine it. What changed most dramatically was the argument used to justify political authority.34
The cultural consequences were just as substantial. Vienna ceased to be an imperial capital, but its intellectual and artistic life carried the marks of the vanished monarchy. Berlin's republican culture explored new forms of art, journalism, architecture and social freedom, even while political conflict remained fierce. Across former Russian and Ottoman lands, new schools, scripts, official languages and historical narratives sought to explain why the old order had ended and what new loyalties should replace it. Displaced communities preserved memories in family stories, religious institutions and associations abroad. The lost empire could appear in these recollections as oppression, security, cosmopolitan possibility or personal catastrophe—sometimes all at once.35
Historical memory has never been neutral. For many Poles, Czechs, Finns and other peoples, the imperial breakdown created opportunities for statehood long denied them. For many Hungarians, Trianon became a defining national grievance. For Armenians, the destruction of Ottoman Armenian life remained inseparable from the unresolved struggle for recognition and remembrance. For Ukrainians and other peoples incorporated into the Soviet Union, the experience of 1917–1922 could signify both a moment of political possibility and the loss of an independent future. Turkish republican narratives celebrated resistance and sovereignty, while debates over minorities, population displacement and Ottoman violence continued to complicate the story. These memories matter because they shape what later generations believe was won, stolen or left unfinished.36
Perhaps the most important correction to the familiar story is that the old empires did not collapse into a ready-made map of modern nations. Their peoples tried many futures: federations, parliamentary republics, socialist unions, constitutional monarchies, autonomous regions and independent states. Some possibilities were defeated on battlefields; others were dismissed in diplomatic rooms; others failed through choices made by their own leaders. Between 1917 and 1924, the world was not simply moving from empire to freedom, or from war to peace. It was discovering how hard it would be to reconcile sovereignty with diversity, social justice with political power, and national independence with the rights of those left outside the nation. The four crowns fell. The questions they had governed did not.37
Sources and Further Reading
Figes, Orlando. A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924. Jonathan Cape, 1996.
Gerwarth, Robert. The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917–1923. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016.
Gingeras, Ryan. Fall of the Sultanate: The Great War and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1922. Oxford University Press, 2016.
Judson, Pieter M. The Habsburg Empire: A New History. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016.
Judson, Pieter M., and Tara Zahra. The Great War and the Transformation of Habsburg Central Europe. Oxford University Press, 2025.
Mawdsley, Evan. The Russian Civil War. Pegasus Books, 2009 edition.
Plokhy, Serhii. The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine. Basic Books, 2015.
Reynolds, Michael A. Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908–1918. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. Weimar Centennial Edition, Princeton University Press, 2018.
German History in Documents and Images. Weimar Germany, 1918/19–1933.
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The Armenian Genocide (1915–1916).
United Nations, Division for Palestinian Rights. The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part I: 1917–1947.